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Abstract
This paper is a historical look at the influence of geography on people. Water had
a great influence on the tactics and strategies of Greek armies. Books and journal articles
were utilized in looking at how water issues influenced the decisions of commanders and
the outcomes of battles. Water was a major influence on the tactics and strategies of the
Ancient Greeks. It played out in issues of transportation, defense, and the supply. Water
concerns permeated every aspect of the Greek warfare, showing itself influential in the
outcomes of battles and wars. This paper seeks to show how the commanders in Ancient
Greece had many different considerations to take into account when waging war, not the
least of which was water. Furthermore, it seeks to bridge the gap between geography and
history by showing how interdependent geography and history are upon one another.
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Introduction

The role of water in war

Water presents all types of considerations, uses, and tactical challenges to
commanders of all eras. Water can be used as a natural barrier to protect a flank
or seal an enemy. Commanders have often used a river to protect their troops
from a sudden attack. Water can be used as a rapid means of transportation for
troops and goods. For example, control of the Mississippi River was of vital
strategic importance during the Civil War for this very reason. Water serves as a
major battleground, as important if not more important than land or air. England
was able to dominate most of the world for many centuries with a very small
army simply through its ability to control the seas. Troops need water to survive,
and thus water supplies, especially to armies in hostile lands, is one of the crucial
considerations a commander of any size force must deal with. Technology has
allowed us some control over water, giving modem commanders better strategic
flexibility. In Ancient Greece this was not the case. This paper looks at how
water influenced the tactics and strategies of warfare in Ancient Greece.

The Ancient Greeks
Before studying the role of water on strategy and tactics of Ancient Greek
warfare, it is first imperative to have a working knowledge of the Greeks during
the time period being discussed, as well as an understanding of the history and
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execution of their conflicts. It is impossible to discuss the effects of anything
from water to the induction of the phalanx formation without a base of knowledge
to work from. This overview will provide the reference point for this paper. This
paper looks at the Greeks and their warfare in two different stages.
As noted by Finley (1979), McMahon (1996), and Starr ( 1971 ), the history
of the Greeks at this time is usually divided into two parts, the Hellenic and the
Hellenistic. The Hellenic history covers the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars,
while the Hellenistic covers Alexander's wars of conquest. Both of these periods
are important when looking at the role of water in Greek warfare. The Persian
and Peloponnesian Wars provide a look at the conduct of Greek warfare in close
proximity to their home city-states. Both the invasion of Xerxes and the SpartaAthenian conflicts allow an examination of the uses of water. The commanders in
this instance were not bothered by the logistical demands that face armies
operating in enemy territory. While it is true both Athens and Sparta invaded the
countryside of rival city-states and besieged their town, thus warranting a need for
fresh water resources, it is also true that they would have intimately known this
territory and had allies of their own located in relatively close proximity. While
these allies may not have been close enough to supply the armies directly or fully
with their water needs, they certainly would have made the logistics much simpler
for the invading armies than they would have faced in a foreign territory. Both
these wars also provide excellent, detailed looks at the siege warfare of the
Greeks, and siege warfare is of particular relevance to the role of water in warfare,
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because water and provisions are a major factor for both the attackers and
defenders.
Alexander' s Hellenistic campaign allows a different look. While
information can be gleaned about water uses in siege warfare and the selection of
battle sites, its most valuable purpose for this study is the insight it provides of
Alexander' s logistical needs. Alexander had major supply considerations for both
feeding his army and supplying it with fresh water. One can imagine the
problems of supplying any large moving force during a dry season, but how much
worse it much have been when moving through deserts! Alexander' s campaigns
provide an excellent look at the constraints water places on the tactics and
strategies a commander was able to employ during this time.

A brief history of Ancient Greece

The Greeks are not to be thought of as a coherent nation. In this time
period (800-300 B.C.), Greece was not a political state like Caesar' s Rome or
Napoleon's France. Instead, what is today known as Greece was a collection of
city-states. Each city-state was a political unit unto itself. It was self-regulated,
had its own form of government, and made its own foreign policy. These citystates coexisted, with each dominating the countryside around it in proportion to
its stature. Often, the city-states would go to war with one another, forming
alliances with other city-states. This developed balances of power among the
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various alliances. The two most important of these city-states, Athens and Sparta,
deserve special mention.
Athens is the modem day capital of Greece, and is located in central
Greece. Connolly' s (1998) research finds that Athens had become the cultural
center of Greece by 500 BC. Its original government was that of a king, like the
other city-states, but it evolved from rule by a king to that of nobility, and then to
a tyrant, until it finally became a democracy on the eve of the Persian War.
Athens dominated the area around it, known as Attica. Athens' military power
stemmed both from having the best navy in Greece, and from her impenetrable
walls that were constructed after the she was sacked in the Persian Wars.
Sparta had a different tradition than that of Athens, as discussed by the
research of Connolly (1981). The Spartans descended from warring tribes who
invaded Greece. They enslaved the native population and forced them to work
"state-owned" farms that provided the Spartans with their livelihood. Sparta was
ruled over by two hereditary kings, a form of government they would keep. By
the J1h century, Sparta had defeated its neighbors and was in control of the
southern part of the Peloponnesus. The Spartans were great fighters and were
rightly recognized as possessing the best army in all of Greece, if not the whole of
the known world at this time. Their army ' s military supremacy was matched only
by Athensian naval power.
Delbruck (1975) and Olmstead (1948) go on to report that the Persian
Wars were a series of wars fought between the Greek city-states and the
conglomerate forces of the Persian King, Xerxes (see figure 2). The Persians
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were a mighty force that ruled Asia Minor (present day Turkey). They subjugated
many of the nations around them, and Xerxes then turned his attention to the west
and the Greeks. A series ofrevolts by some of the Eastern Greek cities under
Persian control led Xerxes to demand subjugation from the entirety of Greece.
When this did not occur, Xerxes dispatched a punitive expeditionary force .
Despite their normal state of civil strife, the Greeks saw the necessity of uniting in
order to drive off the Persians and preserve their way of life. One of the Spartan
Kings, Cleomenes, deposed his dissenting colleague Demaratus, and formed an
alliance with Athens, who was at this time under threat of an eminent Persian
attack. Thus the whole of Greece rallied to the joint banners of the two Greek
powers, in order to repel the Persian army.
When discussing Greek battles of this time, it is important to draw on the
research of Connolly (1981), Lazenly (1996), and May (1984) who provide an
excellent discussion of the main Greek battle formation, the phalanx. The
phalanx consisted of files of men, usually eight deep, with a broad frontage. The
men would fight with short spears that would protrude out from the front of the
formation. When a man in the front fighting rank fell, the man directly behind
him simply stepped-up and took his place. Besides providing men to replace the
front rank, the main job of the men in the proceeding ranks of the phalanx was to
provide a pressure and weight to the battle line. It was usually this pressure that
determined the outcome of the conflict.
Connolly (1981) also points out that the phalanx formation was made
possible by the introduction of the Argive shield. This shield had a buckler that
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allowed it to be attached to the forearm. It protected a man from his knees to his
chin, as well as offering protection to his neighbors exposed right side. When
combined with helmets, this gave the phalanx great protection (see figure 3). The
only weakness of the phalanx formation was an attack on its flank. In the
phalanx, the hoplite soldier was unable to effectively tum and fight to his side
without destroying unit cohesion. Cavalry was especially good at this, and the
Persians had a plethora of cavalry, making choice of terrain very important for the
Greeks when battling Xerxes' armies.
As reported by Delbruck (1975), Smith (1960), and Warry (1986), the first
clash occurred at Marathon. The Athenians sent a runner to Sparta to inform
them of the attack, but due to observance of a holiday, Sparta would be late in
arriving and would miss the battle. It was surprisingly of no-consequence as the
Athenians and their allied hoplites (as Greek soldiers were known) managed to
defeat the Persian expeditionary force. The Persians were unable to defeat the
Athenian Phalanx, which had wisely chosen to fight the Persians on terrain at
Marathon that offered protection to its flanks.
The second noteworthy clash with the Persians occurred at Thermopylae.
Thermopy lae contained a mountain pass that was key to Xerxes' continued march
into Greece and towards Athens. Delbruck (1975) and May (1984) note that the
pass was guarded by a severely outnumbered force commanded by the Spartan
general Leonidus. The Greeks were only protected by a manmade wall. The
Greeks did well, using the confining space of pass to limit the amount of
combatants the Persians could get into battle. This was perfect for the Greeks as
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it allowed them to make full use of their phalanx by pressing forward while the
sides of the pass protected their flanks from the counterattack of the Persian
cavalry. The Greeks held out for over five days, but when the Persians discovered
another pass over the mountains allowing them to assault the Greeks from both
front and back, the battle was lost. The Persian strength of numbers proved too
much and the Greeks were killed to a man. The battle of Thermopylae did
accomplish its main goal of delaying the Persian attack, but it demoralized many
of Sparta's allies. It also opened the way to the siege and sack of Athens. This
siege would later prove important as it would serve as the main proponent for the
construction of Athens's nearly-impenetrable city walls.
Eventually, after defeating the Persians on both land and sea, the Persian
Wars drew to an end with the Greeks victorious. This was not the end of Greek
conflict. After having successfully defended Greece, the Athenian-Spartan
alliance quickly dissolved and relations returned to their pre-war state of hostility.
Both states continued their empire building activities, and this inevitably would
bring them into conflict again.
Starr ( 1971) and Kagan' s (197 4) found that Athens had consolidated her
power of the seas, while Sparta remained the master of warfare on land. War
again broke out between the two states and their respective allies in 431 BC (see
figure 4). Athens' ability to dominate the seas and her newly improved walls,
combined with Sparta's dominance of the area around Athens, meant that neither
side could gain enough of an advantage to win. This war was amicably settled
after Sparta's failed siege of Athens. During this siege the worst killer on either
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side was the Egyptian plague that was imported on Athenian supply ships, wiping
out one-forth of the population.
As detailed by Alexander (1999), Connolly (1981), and Kagan (1974), the
war reopened fifteen years later with Athens' failed conquest of the Sicilian citystate of Syracuse. An Athenian blunder allowed the whole of the army to be
captured in a conquest that should have easily yielded the surrender of Syracuse.
Instead Athens found itself militarily weakened, again at odds with Sparta, who
had again moved out against Athens to relieve the pressure from their ally,
Syracuse. Athens went back on the defensive, holding out for nine years until
their sufficiently weakened navy was finally caught.
The Persian and Peloponnesian Wars mark an important and distinct time
in ancient Greek history. Equally as important and distinct is the history of
Alexander the Great of Macedonia. Alexander was the son of Philip of
Macedonia. Alexander (2000) and Engels (1978) provide research on Phillip' s
army and tactics. Philip was able to bring the Macedonians to prominence among
the Greeks by totally reorganizing his army. First, he created a new type of
phalanx. The major change he made was extending the length of the spears of the
rear rankers of the formation so they could extend past four or five ranks of men
and still reach the opposing formation ' s men, while also giving them lighter
armor to increase mobility. In this way, the phalanx formation allowed many of
the ranks to fight at once and presented an opposing army with a hedgehog front.
This multi-speared front combined with the weight of the formation made it quite
deadly.
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Philip also began to use combined arms tactics by incorporating slingers,
javelin throwers, and men with short-bows into his army. He used these troops to
support the phalanx. Macedonian cavalry also became important under Philip as
well, making use of missile weapons as well as the spear. All this combined to
give Philip an army that was much lighter and more mobile than any seen in
Greece before. At the same time his army, especially the phalanx and slingers,
was the most potent force in the Greek world.
According to Alexander (2000), upon his father' s death, Alexander took
control of the Macedonian army. Alexander was an exceptional general, and had
already commanded a wing of his father' s army while still in his teens. He
decided to launch an invasion of the Persian Empire. Alexander and his army
then embarked on a campaign that would take them all over Asia Minor, from
Egypt to Afghanistan (see figure 5). He constantly defeated the Persian King
Darius, continually driving him further east as Alexander continued to carve up
his empire.
Engels (1974) notes that two impressive facts stand out about this
campaign. First is Alexander's amazing organization of supplies. While his army
of 35,000 men (plus pack animals) is modest by today' s standards, the sheer
logistics of supplying this type of army is mind-boggling. This is true especially
when one considers Alexander was at times in territory that was semi-arid to arid,
he was working with the imprecise knowledge of the day, and he was constrained
to the incredible slow speed of the transportation of his time. Still, he was able to
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Role of Bodies of Water

One of the most obvious encounters generals have with water in terms of
their tactical and strategic considerations is that of bodies of waters. Oceans,
rivers, lakes, and major streams all play a major role in war. When looking at the
influence bodies of water had on the ancient Greeks, three main areas stand out.
They are the role of navies, the use of amphibious assaults, and the transportation
of supplies. Delbruck' s ( 197 5) research confirms this. He notes how the
Persians, like the Greeks, used their ships to furnish provisions, facilitate detours,
and overpower enemies at sea.

Navies
One of the most important effects of bodies of water on Ancient Greek
warfare was their use by navies. Bascom (1976) and Hale (1996) offer insight
into the Greek navies. Navies played a major role in the waging of war of the
Greeks. It is important to understand that navies at this time played a different
role than today. Modem wars, such as World War I, have primarily seen naval
conflicts as an engagement of fleets out to sea. Little contact existed between the
navy and the army in terms of a combined arms attack. True, since World War II,
aircraft carriers have increased this combined arms attack by allowing navies to
dispatch planes that participate in land battles, but no real naval/army dependence
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has existed other than in terms of supply. As Delbruck's research indicates, this
was not the case in Ancient Greece. There was a large link between the fleet and
the army. The reason for this close interdependence is the navy itself. The
Greeks did not posses the ocean going vessels of today. Their main naval craft
was the Trireme.
Thucydides ( 1998) offers a comtempary look at a trireme. A Trireme, as
described by Thucydides, is a light, sleek ship over one hundred feet long and
under twenty feet wide. It was propelled by three tiers of rowers, and its main
form of attack was either to ram its target with a fortified prow, or engage in a
boarding action. In the Persian Wars, dominance of the water by the fleets was
crucial to the armies on the land.

Amphibious Assaults

Bodies of water also provided the means to launch amphibious assaults.
According to Bascom ( 1996), both the Greek trireme's construction and necessary
proximity to land made it a good craft to quickly embark and disembark from.
Since water transportation was much swifter than land transportation at this time,
rivers, seas, and lakes allowed generals to quickly transport any or all of their
troops around. This meant if a general was near one of these features, he could
potentially move a detachment of men quickly from in front of an enemy to their
exposed flank, increasing his strategic and tactical options. This allowed him to
press in on them from multiple sides. Amphibious assaults also allowed a general
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to move his troops safely and quickly around a stronger enemy, or an enemy
position that would be unfavorable to assault via land. If he was unable to do this,
a general could use his army's ability to rapidly disembark and then re-embark to
harass a stronger force before the enemy could fully come to grips with him.
Amphibious assaults could also allow a general to launch lightning strikes on
unsuspecting cities. If a general with adequate transportation was on the coast, he
could thus threaten multiple cites with his presence and force them to pull within
there walls, a feat the same army could not accomplish if restricted to land. This
was especially invaluable in a multi-island area like Greece. A navy and a
navigable body of water gave a commander many strategic options.

Mode of Transportation for Food and Supplies

The main role of bodies of water was that of a means of transportation of
food and supplies. Transportation by land in Ancient Greece was quite slow.
Roads were poor to non-existent and the main source of overland transport was
pack animals. Pack animals have the disadvantage of having to carry food to feed
themselves on the journey, in addition to the cargo they are transporting. They
are also quite slow and greatly affected by harsh conditions such as heat. Water
on the other hand, offers a mode of transportation that is much faster and more
hassle-free than land. Ships could carry much more than animals while not
consuming cargo themselves. Whereas a pack animal can only transport about
200 pounds of supplies, while consuming twenty pounds of supplies a day, a ship
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at this time could carry 400 tons of supplies (Engels 26). Water was used to
transport goods to cities, besiegers, and armies on the move, as discussed later.
Delbruck (1975), Kagan (1974), and Thompson (1972) report extensively
on water's role in helping the Athenians against the Spartans. Archidamin, leader
of the Athenians during the First Peloponnesian War, had a strategy totally
dependant on the full exploitation of water bodies. Archidamin knew the
Athenians could not match the Spartans and their allies on the field of battle. Any
open conflict of land armies would result in an Athenian defeat. Instead, he
planned to remain behind the strong walls of Athens and take advantage of the
Athenian naval superiority. He instigated a blockade of Spartan supplies and
launched sea attacks against the Spartan navy. He also launched amphibious
assaults against Sparta-controlled coasts. His goal was to cause economic distress
to the Spartans to force them to sue for peace. The Athenian plan worked fairly
well. An unforeseeable disaster almost compromised the plan when Athenian
trading ships brought the aforementioned plague back from Egypt, wiping out a
quarter of the population. Ironically, the Spartans were spared from the plague by
the effective Athenian blockade. In the end, the Athenians were forced to
surrender, but their plan worked by sufficiently tiring the Spartans into accepting
an Athenian surrender that left Athens in almost the same condition as when they
began the war.

19

Water supply considerations on the march

When looking at water considerations on the march, it is helpful to view
the Greeks in the Hellenic and the Hellenistic time periods. This paper will not
spend much time discussing the Hellenic period in this respect. As mentioned
earlier, the Hellenic period involved the wars occurring in Greece, namely the
Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. In the Persian Wars, the Greeks were united
against an invading Persian army. This had the effect of allowing the Greeks to
fight in territory they were intimately familiar with, and thus it would have been
easy for them to locate local sources of water, or be supplied by friendly cities
that would have always been in close proximity. The same was true of the
Peloponnesian Wars. Though the Greeks may have invaded other Greek territory,
they still would have been familiar with the area, and most likely would have also
had allies located in the near vicinity. For this reason, it can be assumed that
issues of water supply on the march would have been minimal at best.

Alexander the Great

A much more important period to look at is the Hellenistic Period when
Alexander was leading his forces across Asia Minor in his conquest of Persia.
This era is an excellent period to examine for two reasons. First, Alexander
embarked on a long, far-reaching conquest of lands he could not have been
intimately familiar with. Without the mapping technology of today, he had very
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sketchy details at best when attempting to make decisions about where he was
going and what would be there. This would make supplying an army fairly
difficult. Adding to that burden was the fact that Alexander was leading his men
in many areas that contained desert or near desert conditions. This meant that
figuring out supplies for both food and water would be critical to his success.
Alexander' s ability to obtain supplies would also greatly influence his tactics and
strategy by dictating where he could and could not go.
It is critical to get an idea of the problems facing Alexander when
embarking upon his conquests as discussed by Engels (1978). First was the sheer
size of invading armies at this time. Although the total number of men in
Alexander' s army (35 ,000) is drastically less than those of today, it is important to
remember that the army would travel together and not have the speed or roads
available of modem armies. In addition to this mass of men, ancient armies also
had many additional people with them. Unlike modem, professional armies,
Alexander's army was composed mainly of citizen soldiers, with only a few
mercenary contingents. Because of the slowness of campaigns at this time, many
soldiers would bring their wives along, as well as servants. In Greek armies, it
was commonplace for each hoplite warrior to have one servant. In order to
increase his speed and mobility, Engels (1978) and Connolly (1981) report that
Alexander instituted a policy whereby only one servant was allowed per ten
hoplites, and each cavalryman could have only one servant. Women were also
not allowed on the campaign, though this gradually slackened on the long
campaigns as many of the men took foreign wives. In addition, Alexander also
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only used horses, mules, and camels as pack animals because they were the
quickest and heartiest in the desert-like conditions. All of this had the effect of
making Alexander's army much more compact and quicker, allowing him to
expand the distance he could travel each day. It also had the benefit of cutting
down on the sheer volume of food and water he needed to supply for his army,
making his logistics problem somewhat lighter.
Another problem facing Alexander was the logistics of using pack
animals. Engels ( 1978) does an excellent job of assessing Alexander's problem
with using pack animals. When using pack animals one is restricted on the
number of days' supplies that could be carried by the army. Animal
transportation has the major drawback of needing to be fed. The animals carry
supplies, but they also consume supplies at a rate that is proportional to their
number. Furthermore, they are restricted by the amount of weight they can carry,
which, while much greater than a man, is still relatively small. The maximum
amount of supplies Alexander could carry was four day's worth. Even with 8,400
pack animals, he could only carry four days worth of rations, and that is only
possible by giving soldiers half rations. After that, any additional weight carried
by the animals, even if adding animals, would be totally consumed by carrying
fodder for the animals themselves because the animals could carry enough
supplies for the animal itself to travel more than four days but only by carrying
nothing else, negating its worth. Thus, an army with 40 mules or 4,000 mules
could only march for four days without re-supplying. Ifhe were to supply

22

himself while traveling in the desert, Alexander would be forced to stay within
four days march of a supply depot, and this would restrict his strategic choices.
Alexander also had to have a plan. He could not remain stationary without
sea or river transportation nearby, because he would not have enough supplies
with him to feed his army while waiting around. Even if he were camped during
harvest giving his army plenty of foodstuffs, he would still have a problem
without a river in close proximity. As Engels ( 1978) points out, it is impossible
for an army Alexander's size to draw their daily water requirements from a few
major wells. Even drawing water all day and night continuously, it would be
impossible to draw enough water out without a mechanical pump to supply all the
daily needs of the army. Therefore, an army needed to locate near a fresh water
source that allowed them to spread out to collect water.
To combat these problems, Alexander had three main courses of action.
The first was to travel through particularly dry areas in the appropriate seasons.
Many regions in Asia Minor are desert-like, but if Alexander moved through them
during the right season, they would contain streams and rivers with appropriate
flow levels that could alleviate the army's need to carry water. Another strategy
Alexander could take was to follow rivers. This would allow him access to fresh
water supplies, as well as give him a means to transport supplies to his army
quickly and efficiently. A land like Egypt can be impossible for an army to march
through if they move in the desert, but if they follow the Nile River it can be quite
easy to obtain water and supplies. The final course of action Alexander could
take would be to move from town to town, having his troops fed and watered by
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the towns as he passed through. This could either be done by the good will of the
town, or by force. Alexander' s powerful army made it much more profitable for
cities to capitulate rather than be forced to provide Alexander with supplies.
While these solutions allowed Alexander to complete his conquest of Persia, they
certainly put strategic limits on him by limiting when he could travel, and where
he could go. For example, often it is beneficial for an army to travel through
wilderness so as to be undetected by their foe and thus be able to make a surprise
assault, or at least assault from a surprise direction. Alexander, however, would
be confined from never going more than four days away from a river that could
supply him, or more likely a city. This would certainly allow the Persians to keep
some type of tabs on his whereabouts.

Water considerations for besiegers

The siege was certainly not an art form mastered by the Greeks. In fact,
Greek siege warfare was quite inadequate for the task. As Kem (1999) reports,
during the Peloponnesian Wars it took the large city of Thebes and her Spartan
allies over a year and a half to subdue the tiny town of Plataea, which had less
than 600 soldiers defending it. The Greeks of the Hellenic period simply did not
have the technical know-how in using siege equipment. Thus, instead of only
having to wait until siege equipment could be constructed or transported to a
besieged city, Greek armies were forced to starve the defenders into submission.
This could take several years to accomplish, if it worked at all.
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Kem notes that a siege of a Greek city would occur when the army of the
city was inferior in men or martial prowess to their opponent. Instead of seeking
a pitched battle that would settle the war, the city would choose to keep its army
behind the city walls, thus taking up a defensive position that was much easier to
hold against a superior force. A city's army and settlers would stay in the city
during the siege. During this time, the besieging army would surround the city,
perhaps building counter-walls to prevent the besieged army from making a
"break-out" attempt. The besieging city would then use the crops around the city
to supply themselves and destroy those they could not use or the city would have
access to. The key would then be how long the besieged city's supplies could
hold out, or if they could supply themselves by a water route that the attackers
could not seal off. Either way, they would attempt to wait for allies to relieve
them, or for the enemy to tire or run out of money. Even if the besieged city had
to rely on stored supplies, it would still have quite a bit stored, allowing it to
prolong its surrender. Thus, water supplies played a major role for a besieging
general because he would be in a siege for an extended amount of time.

Water needs of a besieging army

Any general engaging in a siege had some basic water needs he had to
address in order to carry out a successful siege. He had to locate a fresh supply of
water for his men. Almost as important, in order to be successful, he needed to
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have control of the major water transportation routes. If he failed in either of
these, the siege could not be successful.
It is important to note that if a commander was going to have his army in a

sedentary position for at least a year, his army would have to find water sources
that would be available all year long. It can be assumed that any city under siege
will have some way to provide for its own water source. Any foresight at all will
lead the average city planner to conclude that the strongest walls in all of Greece
will be of no use after a couple of days if the city does not receive an adequate
source of freshwater. This considered, an attacking commander who is unable to
provide his men with an adequate source of fresh water will also lose his chance
of victory just as quickly regardless of his armies strength. A few ground wells
will also not suffice, as the logistics of supplying an army in such a way have
previously been proven faulty.
As Kem ( 1999) reports in his research, the Athenian siege of the city of
Pylos suffered from this very problem. The Athenians were reliant on only one
spring to provide them with fresh water. When this proved inadequate, their men
had to dig on the beaches for water. The shallowness of this water made it easily
contaminable and a plague broke out. Thus, it can be said that a commander's
strategic options were limited to engaging a siege in an area where he either had a
large, open source of fresh water such as a lake or river that would be adequate all
year long, or he needed to locate near a salt coastal area that would allow him to
import fresh water on ships.
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The other necessity regarding water for commanders was to have control
of water transportation routes. Without control of these routes, Greek
commanders experienced two possible problems. First, if they could not
successfully blockade the besieged city's supplies, this would mean an extension
of the siege, possibly even indefinitely. The goal of a siege that does not employ
siege machinery to storm the city is to starve a city into submission. To do this,
the besieging army surrounds the city and cuts off its trade and supply routes.
This is a costly and time-consuming process that cannot be successfully
completed if water access to the city creates a gap in the blockade. Therefore, a
commander needed to be able to fully cut off a city, or at least slow the
importation of supplies to a rate that would result in the eventual depletion of
those supplies. This is not an easy task. Not only did the Greek navy have to stop
all manner of ships, but in particularly effective blockades, supplies could also be
brought in by swimmers at night. Thus, a besieging army had to be ever vigilant
to maintain a winning siege.
The o.ther problem a besieger could face was even more serious. If a
besieging force's navy was so outclassed that not only could it not blockade the
city, but the city could itself blockade the besieging army, things would become
really desperate. The slow speed and inefficiency of land transport has already
been shown, and this would only serve to further deplete the treasury of the
besieging army, and weaken its supplies. This would severely restrict the
strategic and tactical abilities of a commander who would now have to turn his
focus on the problems of supplying his army.
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Both of these problems are best demonstrated by Athens and Sparta in the
First Peloponnesian War as reported in the research of Connolly (1981) and
Kagan (1974). Since Athens felt it could not match Sparta in a pitched battle, it
withdrew behind its newly improved city walls. These walls allowed Athens to
repel attacks by the Spartans, and so the Spartans were forced to besiege Athens
and try to force it into submission. Sparta's biggest problem was Athens' superior
naval fleet. Because Athens ruled the seas, she could easily import supplies of
food, water, and equipment from her allies and trading partners, thus keeping
herself in the fight. In the meantime, the Spartans had to expend time and money
to maintain the siege. This was made even more difficult by Athens' ability to
deny Sparta large shipments of supplies via water routes by creating a blockade.
Thus, Sparta had to move most of its supplies overland where its army could
protect it. This cost the Spartans economically, as sieges were quite expensive to
maintain in terms of payment of troops, cost of supplies, and lost labor at home.
This meant that after years of maintaining the siege, the Spartans were forced to
offer Athens a peace that left Athens as it was prior to the start of the war, despite
the fact that the Athenians could not defeat the Spartans in the field.

Non-transportation uses of water for besiegers

Water has more importance for an army than just transportation and
drinking. Many times a nearby body of water or source of water could make a
commander' s job of forcing a city to capitulate much more difficult as it allowed
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them to hold out longer, but this was not always the case. Sometimes, besieging
armies were able to use the local water supply to their advantage. A common
strategy for commanders was simply to deny the besieged city their water source,
thereby bring about capitulations much quicker. Other, more creative, uses
occurred as well.
One of the best ways to end a siege was to force a city to surrender by
cutting off its supplies. One way, as has been observed, is to stop the importation
of food by blockading a city. This was a difficult task, and even if successful
could still result in a long siege as most cities had stores of food saved up for
sieges because certain foods can easily be kept for long times. This was not the
only option though. A commander could also attempt to cut off a city' s water
supply.
Some cities could survive on natural wells and springs within their city
wells, as well as cisterns to catch rain water, but most relied also on either a
source artificially brought into the city or a source supplying a river or stream
running into the city. If the first scenario was the case, a good tactic for
commanders was to try to cut off the supply of water to the city, thereby bringing
resolution to the siege quicker. This could be done by diverting a river or stream
that led into a city, or by destroying an aqueduct or piping that brought water from
an elevated location to the city. This was a prevalent tactic as is evidenced by an
oath taken by the members of the Amphictionic League in the early sixth century
B.C. This oath pledged to not take cities by cutting off their water supply (Kem
1999).

29

.. '
As Kem ( 1999) demonstrates with his research, some commanders had
more creative uses for water in besieging a city. One such use was to poison a
city' s water supply. This could be done a variety of ways, such as adding a
deadly poison, or one that would simply make the city' s inhabitants sick, and thus
weakened. A classic example of this was the Athenian leader Solon' s siege of the
Greek town of Krisna. Solon diverted the river flowing into Krisna to try to force
capitulation. The Krisnaians were undeterred as they were able to survive on the
water supplied by their cisterns and wells. Seeing this, Solon diverted the river
back into Krisna, but added a purgative to it. When the Krisnaians began to drink
the river water again, they all acquired acute diarrhea from the purgative Solon
had added. In their weakened state they were forced to abandon the walls.
As Kem (1999) found, even more creative measures were employed.
When the Greeks launched a siege on the Persian town of Eion, they were unable
to break through the city' s walls. The Greek commander Cimon had the Greeks
redirect the nearby Strymon River, forcing it to flow against the city' s walls.
Since they were constructed of adobe, the walls soon gave way, and the Greeks
were able to take the city.
Equally as ingenious was the city of Croton' s plan to punish its neighbor,
Sybaris, as noted by Kem (1999). After defeating the Sybarites in the field of
battle, the Crotoniates decided to raze their city to avenge the death of their
envoys the Syrabites had murdered before the war. To do this, the Crotoniates
diverted a nearby river so it ran over Sybaris. This submerged the town and
utterly destroyed it.
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Commanders had many uses for water other than for transportation and
drinking. Since a besieged city had to both feed and water its population in order
to continue to hold out, many commanders attempted to cut off both food and
water supplies. This was a solid tactic that could yield results. Some
commanders even came up with more ingenious uses to turn local water supplies
into weapons in their own right, using them to poison a city or destroy its walls.

Water Considerations for the Besieged

Water played an equally important role strategically for those who were
being besieged in Ancient Greece. The major strategic importance of water to
besieged cities has been stated and proven earlier in different section therefore,
this will serve to highlight these areas without reproving their strategic worth.

Water Uses for the Besieged

As discussed earlier, if a besieging army was able to cut off a city's water,
the besieged city would be forced to surrender. Therefore, having a constant
supply of water was crucial. Many cities did not have access to a constant supply
of fresh water within their city walls because, as Kem (1999) reports, the best
defensible position was the main determinate in site selection. Therefore, many
cities were reliant on cisterns to provide water.
When the cisterns were not adequate, aqueducts were used. Aqueducts
were a means of transporting runoff from highlands around the city into the city.
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In his book on the city of Thebes, Symeonoglou (1985) and Brumbaugh (1960)
discuss how this was usually done by a means of underground piping. Thebes
had no natural water supply, so they were forced to supply themselves from
nearby springs and highlands. To do this, they used stone lined conduits that ran
underground for over one kilometer. This brought abundant water into the city
that was protected from being tampered with by invading forces. Kem (1999)
finds similar systems in use. He reports that under the ruler Polycrates, the city of
Samos created their own aqueduct. They cut a tunnel through a hill over a mile
long and eight feet in diameter in order to supply their city with fresh, protected
water.
As Wycherly (1962) notes those cities fortunate enough to locate on a
water source, they could gain two advantages. The first was the city ' s ability to
use the water source as a natural barrier. Assuming the water source was at least
a good-sized river, a simple wall on the coast would make assaults on this area
almost impossible, if they could be attempted at all.
Furthermore, a city that was located next to a major water source had the
important advantage of being able to transport goods into their city. Time and
time again in this paper, the importance of supply has been shown on an army' s
ability to wage war. If a city located on water, it had a better chance of being able
to supply itself during a siege than it did if it was landlocked. As shown by
Athens, a superior navy made this quite easy and allowed the city to stand up to
sieges. Even if the besieged city's navy was not superior, a water source still
offered options. A besieging army that built a wall to encompass a city makes it
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hard to smuggle supplies into the city because relatively few men can watch the
wall and still easily spot someone attempting to do just such a thing. This is
because of the trouble of having to penetrate the wall, as well as the problems of
carrying smuggled goods that would have been heavy in order for them to be
worth the effort to smuggle in. Water made this much easier. As noted before,
the Spartans used swimmers to bypass the Athens fleet and supply the besieged
city of Pylos. It is much more difficult to form a cohesive water blockade that can
detect swimmers, especially in water with any type of waves. Swimmer' s tasks
were made easier by being able to use the water's bouency to lighten the load of
supplies.

A Case Study: Athens

Athens, as written about by Connolly (1998), Hill (1953), and Schaberg
(1999), and Thucydides (1998), offers a good case study to see the strategic
importance of water to besieged city. As noted earlier, after being sacked by the
Persians, Athens set about to create much better city walls. Athens' 260,000
inhabitants were mainly supplied by food from the island of Euboea. Being able
to have access to these supplies was paramount to Athens survival in times of
war. To protect this access, Athens, which is a landlocked city, constructed new
city walls and walls connecting it to its port of Piraeus, three miles away in 460
B.C. (See Figure 6). These walls would be sufficient to repel the Spartans and
protect the Athenian supply lines.
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The key to this transportation route was having a navy strong enough to
keep the sea-lanes open for trade. So, in 483 B.C., Athens created the most
powerful navy in all of Greece. It would be this navy, combined with Athens'
powerful walls, that would allow it to survive the Spartan onslaught.
Connolly (1999) found that in addition to protecting its food supplies,
Athens also had to make sure it had an adequate amount of water. To this end,
most Athenian houses had their own wells and cisterns to collect water. Citizens
also relied on public fountains. These fountains were supplied by water brought
from the hills surrounding Athens. The water was brought by rock-cut conduits
and pipes made of fired clay, even including inspection holes. This water would
then be directed either to a basin reservoir for dipping pots into, or to spouts used
to fill jugs. A final means of securing water was by cutting drainage channels to
channel rainwater into the Eridanus Stream. In this manner, Athens made its
water supply internally self-sufficient and denied its enemies the ability to cutoff
its water.
In taking these precautions, Athens was able to use water to protect itself
in case of a siege. This worked as was noted during the First Peloponnesian War.
Athens' s ability to supply itself with imported food protected by its navy, and its
ability to supply itself with an uncorruptable source of water, allowed the
Athenians to wear down a Spartan army it could not defeat to the point of
accepting a peace that left little changed. This is the power water had on tactics,
strategies, and the outcomes of wars in Ancient Greece.
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Conclusion

Water did have a major influence on the tactics and strategies of war in
Ancient Greece. Bodies of water provided navies with the ability to play
important and strategically significant roles war. Bodies of water also provided a
means of transportation for troops and supplies that was far superior to
transportation on land. Water considerations to armies on the march were also
essential. The ability to have access to water determined where an army could go
and for how long, thus limiting the strategic options of a commander. Water also
played a crucial role for both besiegers and the besieged. The availability of fresh
water was a concern for both sides, and both sides could utilize water to cut
supplies from the other by means of a naval blockade. Besiegers often expanded
their tactical options with creative uses of water, especially by diverting rivers and
streams, while cities on the defensive, such as Athens, could render themselves
virtually siege-proof with good city walls and protection of their access to
waterways.
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